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Headquarters Counter Intelligence Corps Region
970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment APO 225 13 May 1948
File D-219001 V 1150

Summary Report of Investigation:

Subject ROTE KAPELLE (Red Orchestra) : Cross ref: ROEDER, Manfred Dr (OTHELLO)

1 Reason for investigation:

a. The designation ROTE KAPELLE (Red ORchestra) was the code name for a Top Secret operation which the Abwehr initiated in August 1941 after finding the first evidence that Russia was receiving intelligence from certain espionage elements in Western Europe and Central Europe. The Gestapo who took the R/K case over from the Abwehr in July 1942, succeeded in uncovering and largely destroying a wide and well organized espionage net which was in the service of soviet russia. Highly placed Nazi officials considered the R/K case as the most important German counter espionage operation of the entire war. However, the R/K operation also proved its value from a positive intelligence point of view, since a considerable number of transmitters were kept operating with the aid of captured and 'turned' wireless operators, thereby enabling the Gestapo to feed false or inaccurate information to the Russian General Staff. The GEstapo was convinced that the Soviet intelligence did not know of the true fate of their Western and Central European espionage net until AUGUST 1944 when the last communication line to Moscow was cut.

b. A record check let this hq arrive at the conclusion ,in late 1947, that the material so far gathered on the R/K case had been negligible and that a thorough study of the closed case might prove to be profitable inasmuch as a number of personalities formerly connected with the R/K made their appearance in public, supporting S'viet views and policies.

c. Since most survivors of the R/K purge lived in the Berlin (N53/Z75) area, direct contact was established, after obtaining the approval of Higher Headquarters, with Mr WALLACH of Region VIII. The contention of OTHELLO (OTHELLO is the code name of Dr Manfred ROEDER) that the R/K was not 'dead' was further substantiated during a conference on 26 and 27 January 1948 in FRANKFURT (L51 M 67) between Mr Kelly, Hqs 970th CIC Detachment, EUCCOM, Mr Wallach of Region VIII and Mr Gorby and the undersigned agent of this office during which it came to light that former R/K members had been under investigation by Region VIII since the middle of 1947. It was therefore decided to exploit OTHELLO's knowledge of the R/K case and to place special emphasis on those personalities who after due consideration of their background and past activities, could be used as a means of penetrating former R/K personnel. ((page 2))

d. Arrangements were made to have Othello transferred to this area under this hq's jurisdiction, as reported by this office on 31 Dec 1947 SRI Subject Walter HUPPENKOTHEN (FIDELIO), Manfred ROEDER (OTHELLO) file V-1150 to Hqs 970th CIC Det EUCCOM APO 757 US Army. OTHELLO arrived at this HQ on 23 December 1947 and preparations for a thorough prolonged interrogation had been completed by 18 Jan 48.

2. Synopsis of previous investigations:

a. Region VIII's attention had been attracted to several R/K survivors as the result of their leftist political activities. A series of discreet investigations and direct contact with one important former R/K member resulted in the acquisition of valuable personal data on R/K survivors. This material was made available to this office, and proved of considerable value during the course of the investigation of OTHELLO. Furthermore, it became evident to CIC Berlin that survivors of

page 2 (Furthermore it became evident to CIC BERLIN that survivors of the R/K purge made every possible effort to conceal the true nature of their former activities, i.e. participation in an espionage net in the service of Soviet Russia, and to pretend instead that they were former members of a so-called German resistance movement.)

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b. Records in Frankfurt which were consulted prior to OTHELLO's interrogation, revealed that British authorities had taken great interest in the R/K case as early as April 1946 and that they have been conducting inquiries as to the whereabouts of former key members of the R/K ever since. It has also come to the attention of CIC Berlin that British authorities are still conducting a special operation which concerns itself with the R/K. It is not known whether the results of that investigation have been made available to any American Intelligence agency.

3. Synopsis of present investigation:

a. The source of information

(1) OTHELLO had become one of the judges at the Luftgaengericht III Berlin (Air Force Tribunal III Berlin) in Dec 1947 (sic presumably 1941) On 1 April 1942, OTHELLO was assigned for temporary duty as assistant prosecutor to the Reichskriegsgericht Berlin (Combined Army Airforce and Navy Supreme court). When the Gestapo had completed the preliminary investigation of the R/K case, which resulted in the first wave of arrests, the case was turned over to the Reichskriegsgericht for prosecution. OTHELLO was assigned to the R/K case on 17 Oct 42 for investigation and prosecution. OTHELLO, as a Luftwaffe Officer, was considered to be well qualified to handle the R/K case since the principal figure involved in the plot was a Luftwaffe officer working in the German Air Ministry ((Note this is Schulze Boysen case, for which see Allen Dulles "Germany's Underground, and Hans GISEVIUS, To The Bitter End"))).

(2) Although OTHELLO's memory is excellent, he could not give detailed information on all phases of the R/K investigation. The Reichskriegsgericht handled only those cases which fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the Reich proper. In such cases, where civilians were involved and which were not deemed essential to the prosecution as a whole, the Reichskriegsgerichtshof designated the 'Volksgerichtshof' (Peoples Court) as the competent tribunal. Furthermore the Belgian and French counterparts of the R/K case came under the jurisdiction of the Luftgaengericht III Berlin. Othello, retaining his functions as a judge of 'Luftgau III' (Air Force Service Command III) also passed judgement on six (6) individuals of the Belgian-French groups. The prosecution and conviction in all other cases was handled by other personnel of Luftgau III in cooperation with personnel from Luftgau Westfrankreich (Air Service Command Western France). Nevertheless Othello has seen the files on a great number of personalities, even though he was not directly connected with their cases.

(3) Annex A of this report furnishes the names of such Gestapo personnel as were directly connected with the investigation of the R/K case and who, if located and interrogated, could furnish additional information on R/K personalities with a special emphasis on the French and Belgian groups. Annex B of this report gives the names of those judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers, who in Othello's judgment, could, in numerous cases, supplement and verify the contents of this report.

b. Historical background

(1) KENT group: In August 1941 the Funkueberwachung (wireless surveillance) of the Astl (Abwehrstelle) Brussels ((WRONG Funkueberwachung is AgWNV/FU III) the organization known to TICOM as the RADIO DEFENSE CORPS-it was not subordinate to the Abwehr but to OKW SIGNALS COMMUNICATION GROUP, it worked with both Abwehr, Gestapo and ORPO but only located agent transmitters and could not make arrests)

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page 3 (and could not make arrests) arrests see FLICKE DF 116-M and ~~passing in TROOP~~ picked up the first signs of illegally operated transmitters and succeeded shortly thereafter in locating one ~~transmitter~~. This led to the arrest of three Russian Agents: Anton DANILOFF, Konstantin ~~FRITZ~~, and Michael MAKAROFF. Subsequently Fritz KENT, a Russian national, who was the leader of a Russian sponsored espionage ring in Brussels, was arrested. The activities of the Kent group centered around military espionage. Kent operated approximately eight (8) ~~se~~ stations which were serviced by approximately fifteen (15) wireless operators. The senders had direct contact with MOSCOW, Switzerland ((Note this would be ROTE DREI, for which also see FLICKE DF 116 M and particularly DF 116 P, this last particularly for KENT Coro-Arvid, Schulze Boysen etc))), the German group and the French groups. Targets for the Kent group were the Dutch airfields, coastal defenses, railway traffic, and the German industrial output. The Gestapo took the case over from the Abwehr in June 1942 and succeeded in 'turning' KENT. Kent was instrumental in unveiling additional transmitters and breaking a number of codes; he also gave leads which led to the uncovering of the French and German espionage rings. After the Gestapo succeeded in 'turning' a number of wireless operators, the communication with MOSCOW and other European ~~receiving~~ receiving stations was kept in tact - in some cases as late as the middle of 1943 - thus feeding false or inaccurate information to the Russians over a considerable period of time and preventing a premature warning of the other groups connected with the Kent ring.

(2) BORDO Group: As mentioned in paragraph 3 b (1) of this report, the information supplied by Kent led to a wave of arrests and subsequent liquidation of other espionage groups. Soon the Gestapo learned that the Russian JEFMEROFF, one of the original three (3) arrestees, was the leader of a second group which was known under the cover name BORDO. JEFMEROFF operated mainly out of Brussels; his immediate superior was Kent. However, JEFMEROFF acted in some cases independently since he and his group of twentyfive (25) men comprised the technical staff for the entire Western European espionage net. Jefmeroff recruited wireless operators and supplied the various groups with needed technicians.

(3) TINO (Hilda) Group: This group had its seat in Amsterdam and was led by Anton WINTERING, a Dutch national who, in turn, received his instructions from KENT. This group was uncovered through the information Jefmeroff had furnished; however, the action had not been entirely successful as WINTERING was never arrested and out of a total of thirty five (35) persons only from six to eight (6 to 8) were apprehended. The TINO group concerned itself with industrial sabotage and surveillance of German military strength and troop movements on Dutch territory. This group worked very effectively and stood in direct wireless communication with Moscow since 1939. At the time of their discovery, the group had six to seven (6 to 7) transmitter-in operation. The operators were, in the majority, former Dutch seamen. which

(4) GILBERT group: Several coded messages were intercepted by the Abwehr referred to the name of 'Grand-chef' and 'Otto', aliases for Gilbert. At a later date KENT furnished the key to these aliases which resulted in the arrest of Gilbert, a Russian national, who had a long record with the Soviet espionage service. Gilbert was the head of an espionage net working out of Paris. In addition he controlled the entire Soviet sponsored espionage net in Western Europe. Gilbert was in touch with Arvid Harnack, an outstanding member of the German R/K net. Shortly after his arrest in December 1942, Gilbert cooperated

page 4 (Gilbert cooperated) with the Gestapo until he escaped in February 1943. (((CF also Flicke in references given. A British Intelligence report dated either 1947 or 1948 probably available in ONI (Op 32 Y-14?) issued by GCHQ title the Russian Intelligence Service refers to this instance and indicates strong grounds for belief the Russians in Moscow knew that Gilbert had been 'turned' and that he had not given anything away to the Gestapo that they would not have immediately found out from documents taken with him. This British report goes on to say that this man, believed to be named TREPPER, is at present in Moscow and appears to have been exonerated.))). The Gilbert group operated approximately ten (10) senders which were in touch with Moscow. In addition to the industrial espionage and sabotage, agents successfully penetrated German Military Government offices in Paris. Gilbert had contact with groups in the unoccupied zone in France and in Portugal. The Kent, BORDO, TINO and Swiss groups worked under direct supervision of Gilbert. As a result of Gilbert's successful escape, the Gestapo probably merely skimmed the surface of the vast Soviet espionage net to which Gilbert had access.

(5) Lyons and Marseilles Groups: These two (2) groups operated under the supervision of Gilbert: they were only curtailed in their activities after Germany occupied southern France in September 1943. KATZ, fnu, presumably the leader of the Lyons group, was never arrested. OTHELLO's knowledge of the activities of the groups operating in southern France is limited, due to the fact that Othello had been relieved of his duties in connection with the R/K case prior to the completion of the Gestapo investigation. It can be assumed, however, that the aforementioned groups operated on similar principles as the groups referred to in paras 3 b (1), (2), (3), and (4) of this report.

(6) SWISS group: The SWISS group concerned itself mainly with financing the Western European and German groups; in addition they supplied these groups with sabotage material. The Gestapo had collected evidence that the Swiss group maintained wireless communication with the Lyons and Marseilles groups. All further attempts the Gestapo made to gather information on the activities of the SWISS group remained fruitless because of the SWISS neutrality. The R/K investigation merely established the fact that Frau Greta KUCKHOFF was in communication with LANGHOFF, a refugee who left Germany in 1934/LANGHOFF was probably the leader of the SWISS group. (((There is something wrong here. According to FLICKE, in sources cited, and also Huettenhain and Mettig of OKW Chi, see TICOM references, the Swiss link of the Rote Kapelle was the Rote Drei. The Germans established its location by DF from southern France and the Gestapo was ready to raid the house in Berne where the transmitter was when it went off the air presumably because the Swiss had raided it first. However, this Rote Drei transmitter was suspected of having passed Schulze Boysen traffic although efforts to identify captured Schulze Boysen plain text in the intercepted messages failed. Also Flicke has furnished some 250 decodes of what he says or Rote Drei traffic and they are chiefly military and industrial espionage-- rather than the financial administration indicated here. Of course the traffic he has supplied may not be all Rote Drei or Rote Drei from Switzerland or this may be only Rote Drei to Moscow and back and the financial would have been from Berne to western Europe. Examination of the content of these messages can relieve this point however))).

(7) CHORO Group: Successful in 1942 of one of the messages intercepted by the Funkabwehrstelle in August 1941 of

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page 5 (in August 1941 originating)
originating from Moscow and destined for KENT in Brussels, furnished the leads which led to the discovery of the CHORO group (cover name of the Schulze-Boysen, Arvid HARNACK espionage net) German component of the R/K espionage net. Due to the lack of trained personnel and technical facilities during the initial stages of their intelligence activities, the CHORO group, in some instances, utilized the transmitters of the Libertas and other groups ((Cf Flicke in DF 116 P for connection to other groups)) to forward intelligence data to Moscow. The discovery of the link between Berlin and Brussels finally led to the apprehension of Harro SCHULZE-BOYSEN and Arvid HARNACK and the majority of the active members of the Choro group in Sept 1942. Schulze-Boysen, the principal figure of the Choro Group was a convinced radical of long standing, who made his first contact with a representative of the Soviet Intelligence in the person of Alexander ERDBERG, an employee of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin. ERDBERG left Berlin in May 1941 for Russia and maintained his contact with Schulze-Boysen by wireless; however the R/K investigation did not find any evidence indicating espionage activities of the Choro group prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Russia in June 1941. The espionage nets, though, when activated, were well established and ready to operate once called upon, since many of SCHULZE BOYSEN's and HARNACK's communist friends held key positions within the Army and Airforce or had leading positions in civilian life. ((Cf Flicke on difficulties Schulze-Boysen Harnack group had in establishing contact which led to their being contacted by Moscow through Kent. DF 116-P. Also note statement of Mettig that the message which broke the Schulze Boysen case was solved in OKW/Chi and an intimate friend of the Schülze Boysen clique was one of the cryptanalysts who read the message. He called the wife of a member of the clique and was starting to warn her to get away when she thanked him with the statement the Gestapo was at the door!!! Also, according to Dulles, Germany's Underground, previously cited, the entire Rotte Kapelle business was made into a play and presented in the Soviet Zone in Berlin.)) As a result, when communication lines between Moscow and Berlin were completed, valuable and accurate information was immediately obtainable. The following is an example of the calibre and scope of the penetrations effected by the Choro group: The Ministry of Trade and Commerce through Arvid HARNACK; the Air Force Ministry through Harro SCHULZE-BOYSEN; the Department of Labour through Countess Erika von BROCKDORF; Radar Research through Hans-Heinrich KUMEROW; Army and Air Force Ordnance through Johannes GAUDENZ, who represented an aircraft company; ABWEHR through Lt Herbert GOLLNOW and Sgt Horst HEILMANN; Central Registry of Top Secret ~~documents~~ material for the Air Force through Col Erwin GEHRTS; movie industry and theater through Adam KUCKHOFF; Libertas SCHULZE-BOYSEN and Guenther WEISSENBORN; Ribbentrop's Foreign Office through Rudolf von SCHELIHA, Dr Karl HELFERICH and Ilse STOEBE. The original members of the Choro group were gradually reinforced by Moscow with agents, parachuted into Germany, who had received extensive training in Russia as wireless operators. Seven (7) of these agents arrived shortly before the liquidation of the Choro net and had only begun their activities. These Russian agents were all former ~~members~~ KPDP ((Kommunist Partei Deutschland)) members who had left Germany in 1933. A proximately nine (9) transmitters were found operating when Schulze-Boysen was arrested in September 1942. The execution of approximately thirty (30) key individuals out of a total of ~~hundreds~~ (150) arrestees broke the backbone of the Choro espionage organization. Due to the Gestapo's success in keeping open a number of wireless communication lines to

page 6(Gestapo success in keeping open a number of communication) a number of communications lines to MOSCOW open, later arrivals of parachute agents, who were to support the CHORO net, were apprehended before they could establish themselves.

c. Present Activities of R/K Survivors

(1) Details on present activities of the R/K survivors, as far as they are known to the G-2, were compiled in the form of personality reports, which are attached to this report as Annex C. Due to the fact that the survivors of the Choro group are residing today in different parts of Germany, all outside Region V's area, no direct investigation except that initiated by Region VIII, has been conducted as yet in this Region/ However, Othello was able to offer certain details with reference to the activities of the R/K survivors by carefully following notices which have appeared since 1945 in German newspapers, and which make reference to surviving members of the R/K espionage ring. The R/K members who have been executed are listed in Annex D, simply indicating their connection to other R/K personnel.

(2) Judging by their present activities it becomes apparent that the R/K survivors can generally be grouped into the following categories:

(a) Substantial information is available on those former R/K members who have made themselves known in public/ Such personalities have held, or are still holding, positions of importance in public life and their leftist affiliations are well known. The following examples are cited: Leo SKRZYPCZYNSKI was president of the Central Administration for Industry (Zentralverwaltung fuer Industrie) for the entire Soviet zone of Germany until the beginning of March 1948; Jan Bontjes van BEEK, president of the Art Academy in Berlin, wrote a number of articles about art with an outspoken communist tendency; Heinz Wolfgang LANGHOFF, once an unsuccessful actor, became director of the Detusches Theater in Berlin in 1945; Guenther WEISSENBORN, writer and author, publishes pro-Soviet articles in all zones; Dr Elfriede PAUL, KPD Health Minister for Lower Saxony (British Zone) during 1946; Dr Adolf GRIMME, Minister of Education for Lower Saxony since 1946; Prof. Wener KRAUSS, Dean of Marburg University 1945/1946; SILONE, Communist Minister of Labor in Italy; Frau Greta KUCKHOFF, president of VVN for Berlin (Association of the Persecuted Persons under the Nazi Regime), committee member of the Democratic Women's Club, member of the Volksret of the Second German Peoples Congress. The beforementioned personalities have been referred to in the Soviet press as anti-fascists and democrats; any mentioning of their R/K connections with the R/K organization has been carefully avoided, especially after 1946/

(b) The never publicly mentioned nor heard of R/K members belonging to the more interesting group of R/K survivors from a counter-intelligence point of view. These individuals have played in the R/K an equally prominent role as the beforementioned personalities, but they were not rewarded openly for their past activities. The following fall under the second category: Paul SCHOLZ, Max HUEBNER, Count Kay von BROCKDORF, Ruthild HANE, Dr Karl HELFRICH, fnu KUPFERSBERG, Hellmuth MARQUART, Victor SCHABEL, fnu SCHLOESINGER, and Heinz STREHLOW/ Some of these personalities are well trained agents and it can be assumed that they are again secretly active as agents for Soviet Intelligence.

(c) The third group falls under the category of 'turned' R/K members. The following individuals are known to have become agents for the Gestapo: Fritz KUN, Isidor SPRENGER, Albert KOENEN and Margarete and a number of former wireless operators whose names as far as they are known are listed in Annex C.

4. Undeveloped leads:

a. The personality reports as listed under Annex C, in many instances, lack the information as to the identification of each individual R/K survivor. However, it is known that R/K survivors have approached their former defense attorneys making inquiries as to the fate of their former associates. Defense lawyers, judges, and prosecutors, as listed in Annex B, could, in all probability, give additional information on these R/K personalities whose cases they handled/

b. Information so far available on personalities formerly connected with the Gilbert, Kent, Bordo and Tino organizations, especially needs to be supplemented. As mentioned in para 3 a (3) of this report, the interrogation of former Gestapo officials (Annex A) who were connected with the investigation of the Soviet Espionage net, might produce leads which are needed to locate any survivors of the Western espionage net.

c. As is evident from the personality report (Annex C) no leads are available on turned former R/K members except one on Helmuth FELLENDORF. The location of former Gestapo personnel who handled these turned agents would be of primary importance in forming the basis for any future plans in regard to the 'turned' Gestapo agents.

d. The following seems to indicate that R/K members had, as early as 1938, connections in the United States. In August 1942, Ilse STOEBE (executed) received from HERMANSTADT, fnu, in Moscow, through the parachute agent Heinrich KOENEN, a copy of a money transfer dated February 1938 from the CHASE NATIONAL BANK in New York to the CREDIT LYONNAIS in Lyon (France) accrediting Rudolf v. SCHELIHA's account over \$6,500.00 at the BANKHAUS BAER & Co in ZURICH. Von SCHELIHA had not produced any information for some time and ILSE STOEBE pressed von SCHELIHA into further activity by producing a copy of the notification, by which she could prove to von SCHELIHA that he had received the beforementioned amount. As a consequence, von SCHELIHA, who was under pressure, produced several reports shortly before his arrest on 29 October 1942. These reports were transmitted through KOENEN to Moscow.

e. Recently, two incidents may show that there is some connection between former R/K members and the R/K inasmuch as the WISCONSIN University has been mentioned twice in connection with Communist elements.

(1) In the "Stars and Stripes" edition of 3 December 1947 an article appeared entitled "Magazine reports Hitler sent U.S. Girl to death." The Stars and Stripes article refers to a story glorifying Mildred FISH-HARNACK as an American woman who had died as a member of the German underground movement which was published in the WISCONSIN ALUMNI Magazine. The recipient of the report at the University of Wisconsin might offer a lead to further investigate pro-Soviet activities in the United States of former R/K members. Frau KUCKHOFF possibly could have supplied the material for the aforementioned article, since she is a former student at the University of WISCONSIN.

(2) On 20 April 1948 the article "Italy may be asked to oust US girl who backed Reds" was published in the Stars and Stripes. The beforementioned article reports on pro-communist activities of Hanna ALEXANDER during the Italian election campaign. Miss Alexander is a former WISCONSIN University student.

5. Agents comments and conclusions

a. The undersigned Agent, [redacted], as one principal source of information on the R/K case, has been [redacted] to the fullest

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page 8 (has been exploited to the fullest) extent. Further use of Othello in any operation, if initiated on the basis of this report, and reports from Region VIII is not recommended due to the fact that Othello is a major target for former R/K members and their Soviet sponsors. Othello's moves and activities would, in all probability, be watched closely and it can be assumed that, if Othello was ever addressed, he might reveal his relationship to the CIC in order to protect himself.

b. In spite of the fact that no concrete evidence has been obtained through Othello's interrogation that any one of the survivors of the R/K is presently engaged in espionage work for Soviet Russia, the past record of a number of R/K members would indicate that no change of their status as Soviet Agents has taken place. Furthermore, this agent came to the conclusion that in several cases where the Gestapo investigation and subsequent trial could not establish any definite proof of espionage, the individuals concerned were nevertheless involved on the R/K case, as has become evident through Frau KUCKHOFF's correspondence to which this hq has had access ((Note, this correspondence should be extremely valuable for study if an intense effort on suspected agent traffic in Germany is undertaken))).

6. Recommendations:

a. Study this report and any other present and past reports on the subject matter thoroughly at a higher hq to determine whether there is sufficient grounds for reopening the R/K case - this time by United States Intelligence agencies - and whether the opening of an operation designed at investigation, and finally, breaking up a possibly revived R/K net, appears justified.

b. If it is decided to start a special operation or, at least, such preliminaries as are deemed advisable to either initiate a full size operation or eliminate the necessity for an operation, assign individual cases as listed under Annex C, wherever the individual resides in the U.S. Zone to the respective Region for a discreet check and/or investigation, using the personality report as a basis (annex C). Personality reports to be completed and corrected, where necessary, using utmost secrecy so that CIC's interest in the R/K case is not revealed.

c. Check Annex C for R/K members who, in all probability are not presently in the US Zone. Contact British, French, Dutch and Belgian agencies if feasible and where the individual to be investigated is of sufficient importance to warrant such action.

d. Check annex C for R/K members residing in the Soviet Zone of Germany and forward the information available on any such individual(s) to any agency which can follow leads into the Russian zone.

e. Inquire at American and British internment camps as to the location of former Gestapo officials (Annex A) who were connected with the R/K investigation. Reinterrogate such Gestapo officials specifically as to the fate of former R/K members who were turned. Consider the possibility of using a Gestapo official for the purpose of locating 'turned' R/K members. If a turned R/K member can be located, such an individual may possibly be used to advantage of CIC.

f. Where possible, contact lawyers, judges, prosecutors under cover to gather additional information on R/K survivors and to find out about their present activity.

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page 9((their present activities)

g. The leads offered by the publication of the article on Mildred FISH HARNACK in the Alumni Magazine of the Wisconsin University which may have revealed information from Frau KUCKHOFF should be made the subject of a thorough investigation in the United States by the FBI. It should also be called to the attention of the Agency investigating Miss ALEXANDER that the present R/K investigation seems to indicate that the University of WISCONSIN falls within the scope of any future investigation which tends to uncover ~~any~~ illegal pro-Soviet activities in the U.S. Information regarding the activities of former University of Wisconsin students should be exchanged with the Agency investigating Miss Alexander in the light of the R/K investigation.

h. As to Othello, it is recommended that he be returned to his original custodian for reasons elaborated in para 5a of this report. It is further suggested that, if and when he is released, his release be arranged in such a manner that he will not come under the control of Soviet or Soviet sponsored authorities.

i. This agent further recommends that, if possible, close liaison be established with the British agency now handling the R/K case from the British end. This agent feels that an eventual pooling of the results of the British R/K investigation and the contents of this report, and reports from other CIC Offices (Regions) might prove advantageous/

It is hoped that the contents of this report will contribute to the understanding of the ways and means by which Soviet Russia made a;1 necessary preparations for the establishment of a very effective espionage net and it should, therefore, be possible with the knowledge of names and addresses of former R/K personnel, to find evidence that a similar organization has been established today in countries not under Soviet control

signed BRUNO C RICHTER
Special Agent CIC
Regional Special Squad

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(para 3.b.(4))

Reference para 4 of CIC Report: Following is quote from British Intelligence report on "Russian Intelligence Service" SECRET GCHQ February 1948:

" . . . The above does not, of course, mean that when the head of a network finds himself unavoidably cut off from Moscow he will not be expected to follow his own judgement. Such was the case with Leopold TREPPER, the head of a network called by the Germans the "Rote Kapelle", which formed the principal GRU organization operating in Western Europe during the war and in the years immediately preceding it. Trepper was arrested in Paris in August 1942 and at once agreed to work for the ~~German~~ Germans although quickly succeeded in passing to a agent a report on his situation. He then proceeded to delate a number of his agents and he handed over to the Germans a small network which had been operating parallel with but independent of his own. In June 1943 he escaped and was never recaptured. He returned to Moscow in 1945 where an enquiry was held into his conduct. It seems probable that he had been careful only to denounce those of his own agents whom he had reason to believe would be arrested in any case, and that his betrayal of the smaller network had been due to an anxiety to protect his own. We do not know what arguments he used to justify his action, but there has been a report that he was exonerated."

Reference the Schulze-Boysen case, and particularly the name of Weissenborn in para 3.b.(7) of Allen W. Dulles, Germany's Underground, pp 100-101. This account described the position of the important members. Note that Schulze-Boysen's name is given as Herold by Dulles but as Harro by the CIC report and Fricke. Harnack's name is given as Otto by Dulles but as Arvid by the CIC and Fricke. The names of von Scheliha and Weissenborn are also given by Dulles. According to Dulles Weissenborn wrote a play on the Rote Kapelle which, under that title, was produced in the Russian zone of Berlin and had a considerable vogue.

In 7/VI/ broken in ~~OKA/OKI~~ where a Dr Lenz, who was one of the cryptanalysts, saw the name of Schulze-Boysen in the solved message. Because he knew that a younger colleague, HAYMANN used to go to the Schulze-Boysen house, he told him of seeing this name and HAYMANN attempted to warn Frau Schulze Boyson. LENZ and HAYMANN were arrested. HAYMANN admitted that he was a member of the Schulze-Boysen ring "from communist convictions" and had been assigned to carrying on espionage in In 7/VI (The Signal Intelligence Agency of the German Army High Command to which work on Russian agent traffic was at that date assigned). HAYMANN was condemned to death but nothing except lack of caution could be found against Dr LENZ and by agreement with the Abwehr he was left in In 7VI. In 1944 he requested and received a transfer to the Foreign Office and was last heard of as assigned to Konstanz .

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